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Introduction
As one of fundamental problems in cryptography, we will consider the problem of secret key agreement in this paper. That is to say, we will consider how to generate a common secret key by two parties not sharing such a key initially in the situation that a wire-tapper has access to the communication channel between two parties. Many models of this problem were presented and and analyzed in the literatures [1] - [4] . Recently, key agreement over wireless channel is experimentally studied [6] .
Maurer [5] and Ahlswede and Csisźar [7] considered the interactive model of secret key agreement from an initially shared partially secret string by communication over a public channel.
Maurer [5] considered the following model. Two parties, Alice and Bob, who want to share a secret key, and the wire-tapper, Eve, receive the bits randomly generated by a satellite over independent binary symmetric channels (BSC) respectively. We call this model Maurer's model. Maurer [5] proposed an interactive protocol in his model, and he showed a lower bound on key rates at which Alice and Bob can agree a secret key. Note that the key rate is defined as length of the secret key generated by Alice and Bob per channel use by the satellite.
In Maurer's original model and protocol, channels are assumed to be BSC, and received signals are assumed to be digital signals. However, signals in practical channels are analogue. Recently, key agreement over wireless channel is experimentally studied by Aono et al. [6] . However, information theoretic analysis of the key agreement over analogue channels has not sufficiently conducted. In order to close the gap between Maurer's results and the experimental study, we will modify Maurer's model to use Gaussian channels instead of BSC, which we call Gaussian Maurer's model.
In Gaussian Maurer's model, Alice and Bob can use the results of soft-decision of analogue received signals. They can determine the reliability information from this results and use it for generating a common secret key. In this paper, we will propose a protocol for secret key agreement using the reliability information. Then, we calculate key rates at which Alice and Bob can agree a secret key in our proposed protocol.
Considering the situation that Alice, Bob, and Eve hard-detect the signals that are sent out by the satellite, Maurer's original model can be seen as the special case of Gaussian Maurer's model. Thus, we can compare the protocol in Gaussian Maurer's model and one in BSC Maurer's model. In order to show advantage to use reliability information, we will compare the key rate in our proposed protocol and the key rate in Maurer's protocol in which Alice and Bob use only harddecision. that uses only hard-decision. From the result of this comparison, we will show that the higher key rate is obtained by using our proposed protocol than the protocol that only uses hard-decision.
Rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we will introduce Maurer's model modified to use Gaussian channels instead of BSC. In section 3, we will show our proposed protocol using reliability information. In section 4, we will compare our proposed protocol and Maurer's protocol with hard-decision. In appendices, we will prove the lemmas that is needed for the proof of theorem that derives a lower bound on key rates at which Alice and Bob can agree a secret key.
Secret Key Rate in Gaussian Maurer's Model
Consider the following key agreement problem, which we call Gaussian Maurer's model. Assume that a satellite randomly generates signals and sends it to two parties Alice and Bob who want to share secret key and the wire-tapper Eve over three independent memoryless Gaussian channels. Their noises at time i, denoted N 
, is drawn from a distribution P U n on a signal set in R n and this sequence of signals satisfies power constraint
2 ≤ 1 for all sequences u n . Alice, Bob, and Eve receive
, as outputs of these three channels at time 1 to n respectively. They are assumed to know the distribution P U n and noise variances V A , V B , and V E . Note that capital letters denote random variables and corresponding small letters denote realizations in this paper.
After Alice, Bob, and Eve receive signals, Alice and Bob communicate over a public channel. This channel is assumed to be noiseless and discrete, and its capacity is finite. Every messages communicated between Alice and Bob can be intercepted by Eve, but it is assumed that Eve cannot fraudulent messages nor modify messages on this public channel without being detected. Let C be the entire communication held over this public channel. After enough communication over the public channel, Alice computes a secret key S on a key alphabet S as a function of her received signals X n and all information C over the public channel. In a similar way, Bob computes a secret key S ′ on S as a function of Y n and C. The secret key rate in this model is defined as follows. Note that we will take all logarithms to be base 2, and hence all the entropies will be measured in bits.
Definition 1 For given noise variances V A , V B , and V E , a rate R is said to be achievable if for every ǫ > 0 there exists a protocol for sufficiently large n satisfying
and
where |S| denotes the number of the elements in S.
Definition 2
The secret key rate for given noise variances V A , V B , and
, is the supremum of all achievable rate.
Secret Key Agreement by Soft-Decision of Signals
In this section, we will propose a protocol that uses reliability information of signals and calculate a lower bound on the secret key rate in this protocol. In our proposed protocol, the satellite selects input signal
are also i.i.d. respectively. Let a 1 , . . . , a K be a positive monotonically increasing sequence, and let E 1 , . . . , E K be sets, where jth level set is defined as
The procedures of our proposed protocol is as follows.
From the received signal
where the set E c j is the complementary set of the set E j in the set of real numbers R, and E 
Alice and Bob send sequences
∆ is similarly defined as
For given (W
∆ , then we should discardX (i) ∆ in our protocol. Indeed, if we keepX
, then a negative term is added to the lower bound on a secret key rate shown in Eq. (12) . Furthermore, if the difference between Eve and Bob's ambiguity aboutX
∆ is smaller than the difference between Eve's ambiguity
∆ , we should generate a secret key fromỸ
∆ . For this purpose, we consider the sets A, B ⊂ {1, . . . , K} × {1, . . . , K}, which are defined as
is in the set A, we useX
∆ for generating a secret key, otherwise we discardX
for generating a secret key, otherwise we discardỸ
Thus, we determine discrete random variables
and we use them for generating a secret key instead of X 7. Let F be a set of two-universal hash function [8] (see also Appendix B.1) from {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n to S. Alice randomly choose a hash function f ∈ F, and publicly tells the choice to Bob. Then, Alice and Bob's final keys are
In order to guarantee that Alice and Bob can compute the same key in step 6, we set the rate 1 n log |M A | and 1 n log |M B | of public messages according to the following lemma, which is derived by modifying "SlepianWolf Coding" [9] for continuous random variables.
Lemma 1 Suppose that we set
then there exist encoders and decoders such that the decoding error probabilities Pr{X
Thus, Eq. (1) is satisfied for sufficiently large n.
In order to guarantee the security of the protocol, we set the key rate 1 n log |S| according to the following lemma, which is derived by modifying the so-called "left over hash lemma" [10] - [12] for continuous random variables.
Lemma 2 Suppose that we set
then
is satisfied for sufficiently large n.
Note that F is a random variable on F , and all information C over the public channel correspond to (W (8)- (10), we obtain the following theorem that gives a lower bound on secret key rate R S (V A , V B , V E ) in this protocol.
Theorem 1 By using our proposed protocol, we achieve the lower bound on the secret key rate
. (12) Note that from the rule in Eqs. (6)- (7). ,we can rewrite the Eq. (12) as The relation between SNR and the key rate in our proposed protocol for several NNR.
is lower bound on the secret key rate when we use onlyX
is lower bound on the secret key rate when we use onlyỸ n ∆ for generating a secret key, and 0 is trivial lower bound on the secret key. By the rule in Eqs. (6)- (7), we choose the maximum among these lower bounds on secret key rate for each (w A , w B ) in order to make the lower bound on the secret key rate as high as possible.
Note that encoding in step 5 and decoding in step 6 are implementable by using low-density parity check codes [13] , [14] .
Comparison to a Protocol with HardDecision
In this section, we will show the relation between signalto-noise ratio (SNR) and the key rate achieved by our proposed protocol for several noise-to-noise ratio (NNR). We will also show the comparisons between the key rate achieved by our proposed protocol and the key rate achieved by the protocol that Alice and Bob use only hard-decision for generating a secret key.
The relation between (SNR) and the key rate achieved by our proposed protocol for several NNR is presented in Fig. 1, where sets E 1 , E 2 , and E 3 are de- and NNR is defined as VE VB , and we assume V A = V B . From this figure, we observe that we do not obtain a high key rate when SNR is too high or too low.
In order to show advantage to use soft-decision, we compare the key rate achieved by our proposed protocol and the key rate achieved by Maurer's protocol in which Alice and Bob use only hard-decision for generating a secret key. The result of this comparison is presented in Figs. 2(a)-2(c) .
n to guess the secret key. However, the numerical calculation of the key rate by Maurer's protocol in Gaussian Maurer's model is difficult when the block length of repetition code used in his protocol is 2 or larger. Thus, we calculate the key rate in BSC Maurer's model instead of Gaussian Maurer's model when the block length of repetition code used in his protocol is 2 or larger. In the calculation of the key rate in BSC Maurer's model, we consider the situation that Alice, Bob, and Eve harddetect received signals according to the similar rule as in Eqs. (4) and (5) . In this situation, we can convert three Gaussian channels into independent binary symmetric channels with error probabilities ǫ A , ǫ B , ǫ E given by
where the complementary error function erfc(z) is defined as
Note that this way of the comparison gives Maurer's protocol advantage because a wire-tapper in Gaussian Maurer's model is more powerful than in BSC Maurer's model. † Hence, the key rate achieved by Maurer's protocol in Gaussian Maurer's model is lower than that presented in Figs. 2(a)-2(c) .
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed Gaussian Maurer's model and the protocol with reliability information based on the result of the soft-decision in this model. As a result, we have obtained a higher key rate than Maurer's protocol. This is because that the correlation † The wire-tapper in BSC Maurer's model can use continuous random variables Z n to guess the secret key, but one in BSC Maurer's model can only use quantized versions of them.
between X ∆ in Eq. (6) and Y and between Y ∆ in Eq. (7) and X obtained by using the reliability information is stronger than the correlation betweenX ∆ in Eq. (4) andỸ ∆ in Eq. (5) obtained by using the hard-decision.
However, we do not know the optimal way to determine sets E 1 , . . . , E K and its number K. Intuitively, one may think that the more sets we use, the higher rate we obtain. However, this intuition does not seem to be always true. Actually, there exists the case that we cannot obtain higher key rate though we use many sets. Furthermore, we have to find the optimal signal constellation used by the satellite. These problems are future research agenda. We use the so-called "bin coding" proposed by Cover [15] in this proof. The procedures of bin coding is as follows.
Assign every x n ∆ ∈ X n ∆ to one of |M A | bins independently according to the uniform distribution on M A .
Alice sends the index i of the bin to which x n ∆ belongs. Then letφ n (x
where γ > 0 is an arbitrary fixed small constant, and we denote the pair (W n A , W n B ) as W n . Then, for given y n , w n , and the received index i, declareψ n (i, y n , w n ) = x n ∆ if there is one and only one pair (x n ∆ , y n , w n ) such thatφ n (x n ∆ ) = i and x n ∆ ∈ S n (y n , w n ). Otherwise, declare an error.
We will evaluate the decoding error probability averaged over randomly chosen encoders as follows. We have an error if X n ∆ is not in S n (Y n , W n ) or if there is another symbolx n ∆ ∈ X n ∆ in the same bin. Thus, we can define the events of error
Then the decoding error probability averaged over randomly chosen encoders Pr{X
(A· 1)
n } is evaluated as
which tends to 0 as n → ∞ by the weak law of large numbers. To bound Pr{E (1) n }, we rewrite it as
where
Furthermore, we can rewrite (A· 4) as
, then from the definition of S n (y n , w n ), we have
Thus, we have
Hence, we have
From Eqs.(A· 3)-(A· 6), we upper bound Pr{E
which exponentially tends to 0 as n → ∞ if
Since the decoding error probability Pr{X
n , W n )} of randomly chosen code tends to 0 as n → ∞, there exist at least one pair of an encoder and a decoder such that the decoding error probability Pr{X n ∆ = X n ∆ } tends to 0 as n → ∞.
Appendix B: Proof of lemma 2
In this Appendix, we will show the proof of lemma 2. In section B.1, we introduce a two-universal hash family, which is used for computation of a secret key. In section B.2, we define the security of the protocol in the sense of the variational distance, and we show the relation between the security of the protocol in the sense of the variational distance and the condition Eq. (2). This relation implies that if the security of the protocol in the sense of the variational distance is satisfied, then the condition Eq. (2) is satisfied. In section B.3, we relate the size |S| of a secret key S and the size |M A × M B | of public messages M = (M A , M B ) to the security of the protocol, and we show that if we set
then there exists at least one hash function f that satisfy Eq. (2) for sufficiently large n.
For the simplicity of notation, we denotes the integral over R n as unless otherwise specified, and we abbreviates P R n M n |Z n W n (·, ·|z n , w n ) as P R n M n |z n ,w n (·, ·). The variational distance P 1 − P 2 between the probability distribution P 1 and P 2 on V is defined as
(A· 8)
B.1 two-universal hash family
In order to extract an almost secret string (secret key S) from a partially secret strings (a pair R n of random variables X n ∆ and Y n ∆ ), we use a two-universal hash family F . A set F of functions f : X n ∆ × Y n ∆ → S is said to be a two-universal hash family if we have
for any r n = r ′ n ∈ X n ∆ ×Y n ∆ , where F denotes a random variable on F and P F denotes the uniform distribution on F . For given Eve's received signals z n ∈ R n and reliability information w n ∈ W A × W B , the jointly conditional distribution P SM|z n ,w n (s, m) of a secret key S = f (R n ) and public message M is given by
Note that since S depends on a hash function f , it should be referred as S f . But, we use the above notation for convenience in this paper.
B.2 The security of the protocol in the sense of the variational distance
In order to prove lemma 2, we define the security of the protocol in the sense of the variational distance in this section. If a secret key S is independent of Eve's information and its distribution P S is close to the uniform distribution PS on S, we decide that the secret key S is secure in the sense of the variational distance. In the other words, we define the security of the protocol as
where P M|z n ,w n is the marginal distribution of P SM|z n ,w n , and PS × P M|z n ,w n is the product distribution of PS and P M|z n ,w n As an extension of [16, Lemma 1] to continuous random variable, the following lemma relates the security of the protocol in the sense of the variational distance to the security of the protocol in the sense of the entropy shown in Eq. (2).
Lemma 3
The conditional entropy H(S|Z n W n MF ) is lower bounded by (11) . From this lemma, if E f [∆ f ] is sufficiently small, a secret key S is secure in the sense of the entropy. Proof. Let ∆ f,m,z n ,w n := P S|m,z n ,w n − PS .
(A· 12)
Then, we can rewrite ∆ f as
, and m ∈ M A × M B , we obtain
which follows from the continuity of entropy [15] 
from Jensen's inequality for w n , m, where we let ∆ f,z n := m,w n P MW n |z n (m, w n )∆ f,m,z n ,w n . Averaging Eq. (A· 15) over z n , we obtain
from Jensen's inequality for z n . Moreover, averaging Eq. (A· 16) over f , we obtain
from Jensen's inequality for f .
Note that when we use Jensen's inequality for a continuous random variable, the condition of absolutely integrable
must be satisfied [17] . In this case, from the fact that 0 ≤ ∆ f,z n ≤ 2, this condition is satisfied.
B.3
The relation between the size of a secret key and the security of the protocol
The following lemma relates the size |S| of a secret key S and the size |M A × M B | of public messages M to the security of the protocol.
Lemma 4 For the size |S| of a secret key S, the size |M A × M B | of public messages M, and the security of the protocol ∆ f , we have
where E f denotes expectation for a uniform distribution on F .
Proof. This proof is based on the techniques in [18, Chapter 5] . In the following, we will prove
where ∆ f,z n ,w n = P SM|z n w n − PS × P M|z n w n , (A· 21)
Averaging Eq. (A· 20) over z n and w n , we obtain Eq. (A· 19).
For given z n ∈ R n and w
and we define the set A c n as the complement of A n on X n ∆ × Y n ∆ . Then, ∆ f,z n ,w n for given f ∈ F is upper bounded by
Eq. (A· 22) follows from the definition of the variational distance and f −1 (s). Eq. (A· 23) follows from the fact
, and P M|z n w n (m) = P R n M|z n w n (A n , m) + P R n M|z n w n (A 
Furthermore, we can rewrite the inside of the root of Eq. (A· 27) as
where Eq. (A· 28) follows from the fact that PS(s) = 1 |S| and s P R n M|z n w n (f −1 (s) ∩ A n , m) = P R n M|z n w n (A n , m). Then, we can rewrite the first term of Eq. (A· 28) as s,m P R n M|z n w n (f −1 (s) ∩ A n , m) 2 = s,m r n ,r ′n ∈f −1 (s)∩An P R n M|z n w n (r n , m) P R n M|z n w n (r ′ n , m) = m r n ,r ′n ∈An δ f (r n ),f (r ′n ) P R n M|z n w n (r n , m) Thus, averaging Eq. (A· 28) over f , we obtain m r n ,r ′ n ∈An E f δ f (r n ),f (r ′n ) − 1 |S| P R n M|z n w n (r n , m)P R n M|z n w n (r ′ n , m). (A· 31)
Since f is chosen from a universal-hash-family, we obtain E f δ f (r n ),f (r ′n ) − 1 |S| ≤ 1 for r n = r ′ n 0 for r n = r ′ n from its definition (shown in Eq. (A· 9)). Thus, Eq. (A· 31) is upper bounded by m r n ∈An P R n M|z n w n (r n , m)P R n M|z n w n (r n , m) ≤ m r n ∈An P R n M|z n w n (r n , m) 1 2 αn (A· 32) ≤ r n ,m P R n M|z n w n (r n , m) 1 2 αn (A· 33)
where Eq. (A· 32) follows from the fact that P R n M|z n w n (r n , m) ≤ P R n |z n w n (r n ) ≤ 
Proof.
Suppose that we set α = H(R|ZW) − δ for δ > 0, the second term of Eq. (A· 19) exponentially tends to 0 as n → ∞ by using the Chernoff bound [15] . On the other hand, suppose that we set 2) is satisfied for sufficiently large n.
